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The Falklands War: A Moral Balance Sheet 
 
In what follows I examine the events of the Falklands War in the light of the just war 
tradition and come to some conclusions about the moral justifications which might be offered 
for the two parties involved.  For the purpose of the discussion I assume that there is, indeed, 
such a thing as a just war and I shall, thus, not be concerned to defend this claim against the 
claims of pacifism in its various forms.  I simply take it that there are circumstances in which 
recourse to violence is, in principle, morally justified and that there are morally defensible (or 
at least tolerable) means of prosecuting such just wars. 
These two aspects of the just war are frequently distinguished in moral discussion so 
that we have (to use the traditional Latin tags) – jus ad bellum (the justice of the war) and just 
in bello (justice in the war). 
For any conflict it may thus be asked not only whether the belligerent parties are 
justified in fighting at all but also whether the way in which they fight in accordance with the 
set of international understandings and formal agreements which make up the modern 
concept of the just war. 
 
Jus in bello Issues 
In the case of the Falklands conflict, there is relatively little that needs to be said in 
regard to the conduct of the war itself.  The Falklands war was remarkable for the adherence 
of both parties to the laws of war and to general just war understandings.  Hastings and 
Jenkins comment that it was ‘fought with remarkable respect for decency on both sides’1.  
The International Committee of the Red Cross also gave the belligerent parties a broadly 
clean bill of health in their 1985 report.2 
There are nonetheless some matters that might be discussed.  In regard to weapons 
use, questions have been raised about the employment of cluster bombs against Port Stanley 
airport and about the use of phosphorous munitions (both by British forces).  Bluth (whose 
comment this is) describes the former as ‘clearly contradicting the principle of 
proportionality’.3  It isn’t clear to me why cluster bombs should be thought to be particularly 
objectionable on these grounds, although it might be argued that munitions of this kind are 
rather more than usually indiscriminate. 
Again, the Argentineans apparently had stocks of napalm that they might have used 
had circumstances required it, or opportunities presented themselves.  Phosphorus and 
napalm seem to me to be particularly unpleasant weapons but I am nonetheless unable to find 
unambiguous moral principles by which these may be clearly distinguished from other 
modern weapons.  I am thus not able to support an argument that their employment (or 
deployment) in this conflict contravened the principles of the just war.  No specifically 
prohibited weapons were used in the war (i.e. there was no employment of gas or biological 
agents). 
As noted earlier, general observance of the Geneva principles was of a very high 
order.  Non-combatant status was generally protected (there were only three civilian 
casualties in the entire war) and prisoners on both sides seem to have been well treated and 
speedily repatriated.  On the other hand, there is the oft-cited incident at Goose Green.  This 
took place during an assault by British paratroops on the schoolhouse.  I take my account 
from Hastings and Jenkins – 
The Argentine defenders fought back fiercely until a white flat 
suddenly appeared from an enemy position.  One of D’s subalterns, Jim Barry, 
moved forward to accept the surrender.  He was instantly shot dead.  It was 
almost certainly a mishap in the fog of war rather than a deliberate act of 
 2
treachery, but the infuriated paras unleashed 66mm rockets, Carl Gustav 
rounds and machine-gun fire into the building.  It was quickly ablaze.  No 
enemy survivors emerged.4 
That this was, indeed, an aberration is indicated by the fact that surrender was offered 
and accepted on the following day, before the main attack on the Goose Green garrison 
actually began.  In the context, it seems reasonable to accept Hastings and Jenkins’ 
judgement that it was an ‘unfortunate accident’ with ‘no moral blame on either side’.  There 
were few other incidents of this kind although a very much more recent report (September 
1992) raises the allegation that during the battle around Mount Longdon some capture 
Argentine soldiers were summarily shot.  It remains to be seen whether these allegations are 
sustained and what precisely the circumstances of the shootings were.  At this stage it does 
not appear that these incidents would seriously challenge the general claim that the Falklands 
war was generally fought in accordance with the requirements of international humanitarian 
law. 
Before leaving questions of jus in bello it might be noted that the fact that the 
Falklands War was apparently fought in quite strict accordance with the requirements for a 
just war is not unimportant.  In recent times it has been quite fashionable to argue that there 
can be no such thing as a just war because modern weapons and modes of fighting are 
inevitably disproportionate and indiscriminate.  They thus inevitably breach the jus in bello 
requirement that harm inflicted be in proportion to the good achieved and that non-
combatants must be protected.  The Falklands War provides a specific counter example to 
this claim.  There is little evidence of gratuitous, or unnecessary killing in any phase of the 
war and, as noted above, civilian casualties overall amounted to just .3% of the total (3 out of 
900).  Of course, there are reasons why these things were so, some of which have to do with 
the peculiarities of the location and others with diplomatic and political considerations.  
These do not alter the fact that the Falklands war shows that it is still possible to fight within 
the spirit and intentions of humanitarian law if the belligerent parties wish to do so.  The 
much more contentious question as to whether the losses in the war as a whole were in 
proportion to what was at issue (i.e. whether the war itself was just) will come up for 
discussion below. 
 
Jus ad bellum 
The just war tradition provides a number of tests on the basis of which the moral 
legitimacy of the recourse to violence to secure political ends may be determined.  Prominent 
amongst these is that there must be a just cause.  That is, there must be come worthy moral 
end to be achieved whose values will offset the inevitable losses of war.  This statement 
implies a second requirement for a just war.  In order that the ends do justify the means (in 
this sense), there must be some proportion between the value of the ends sought, and the cost 
of achieving them, in terms of human lives and the destruction of property.  Speaking 
generally, it may be said that a great deal of the killing of war has been gratuitous.  That is to 
say, the human harm has not been instrumental to any purpose that might have morally 
justified the war in question.  This consideration applies particularly to the killing of civilians 
or non-combatants and it provides the basis for the requirement of discrimination, already 
referred to.  As with proportion, it is a requirement that may be applied both to the war as a 
whole and to individual actions within it.  To resolve to act in such as way as to promote 
discrimination and proportionality is to have a ‘right intention’ with regard to the war as a 
whole.  Right intention is another requirement of the just warrior. 
Connected with the proportionality principle is the demand that recourse to war must 
show some prospect of success.  Again the logic of this is that unless there is such a prospect 
the inevitable losses will not be offset by morally overriding gains.  A recognition of the 
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enormous waste of war also lies behind the requirement that it should be a last resort, that all 
alternative means of achieving the desired end should have been exhausted before recourse is 
had to violence.  This principle may also be taken to reflect the fact that violent means are in 
any case uncertain means and that the consequences of war are very frequently not what 
those who initiate them anticipate. 
It is also sometimes said that for a war to be just it must be formally declared and by 
legitimate authority.  In many ways, the first condition has become obsolete.  Wars are no 
longer formally declared and it may be that this is no bad thing.  Conflicts that are entered 
into without formality may be easier to end.  The requirement of legitimate authority may 
also be inappropriate.  There may well be representatives of social aggregations who we may 
think to be morally justified in committing their people to war despite their apparent inability 
to pass a formal legitimacy test (insurgent leaders, generally, would seem to fall into this 
category).  In the case of the Falklands war there was no formal declaration of war by either 
party.  In line with the immediately preceding comments, we do not need to inquire whether 
the Argentine Junta was, indeed, legitimate in this sense.  On the other hand, it might be 
noted here that some writers have argued that only wars entered into with the full knowledge 
and consent of the people of the state concerned are legitimate. 
The example often used is that of the Vietnam War where it is asserted that United 
States participation would not have passed this test.  This is a very complex matter to 
determine, raising as it does difficult questions that go well beyond the justice of a particular 
war.  In the present case, it seems that the Falklands War enjoyed at various times a 
substantial degree of popular support in both of the countries concerned.  On the whole it 
may be better to treat the matter of just ad bellum directly rather than through uncertain 
constitutional niceties. 
In regard to the just war claim itself, tradition suggests that there may be three 
justifications for the recourse to war.  The are righting wrong, inflicting punishment and 
responding to a prior attack.  Of these, the infliction of punishment would seem to be the 
most difficult to support on utilitarian grounds.  The usual deontological justification is 
inevitably backward looking and the application of punishment uncertain (both as regards the 
guilt and the identity of the punished party).  It is also very likely to be productive of further 
violent episodes as punishment is sought for perceived prior wrongful punishments.  For all 
that, there are contemporary cases where the claimed justification for acts of war amounts to 
a claim of just punishment.  The United States air attack on Libya in 1986 and numerous 
Israel attacks on PLO bases might fall into this category, although some of the latter could 
also be considered under the heading of reprisals in the context of an on-going war.  This 
principle is not, however, relevant to the Falklands situation, since neither side made the 
claim and since the events surrounding the war do not suggest that it is appropriate.  On the 
other hand, the claim to be righting a long-standing wrong and the claim to be fighting in 
response to aggression are central to the moral claims made by the respective parties. 
The just war claims of Argentina and Great Britain in regard to their participation in 




Argentina has a long-standing claim to territorial sovereignty over what is called by 
that country the Islas Malvinas.  (Without wishing to prejudice the substantive issue, I shall 
continue to refer to them simply as the ‘Falkland’ Islands.)  The basis of this claim is that 
Argentina was the regional heir to the Spanish colonial owners who in turn had made an 
agreement with Great Britain in 1790 (Nootka Sound Convention) under which the latter 
renounced any colonial ambitions in South America and adjacent islands.  This, in turn, 
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provided justification for Argentina’s violent occupation of the Falkland Islands in April 
1982. 
However, closer examination of the historical detail suggests that the legal and moral 
situation might be rather less clear cut than this bald description would imply.  In the first 
place it seems evident that the British authorities did not ever quite give up their interest in 
the Falkland Islands, despite the convention of 1790 and despite a much-cited adverse report 
by Dr Samuel Johnson  Of the Falkland Islands, he said they were – 
 …. thrown aside from human use, stormy in winter, barren in 
summer, an island which not even the southern savages have dignified with 
habitation, where a garrison must be kept in a state which contemplates with 
envy the exiles of Siberia, of which the expense will be perpetual.5 
Spain finally quite the region in 1811 and Argentina established some sort of 
administration on the Falkland Islands around 1820.  This continued until 1833, when a 
dispute arose between the administration and some American sealers which resulted in the 
eviction by an American warship (that just happened to be at hand) of almost all of the 
Argentineans and the destruction of the settlement.  It was at this point that the British took 
advantage of the situation to establish themselves.  The British claim to sovereignty over the 
Falkland Islands is based on continuous possession since that date.  This is the doctrine of 
prescription, under which continuous possession over a long period generates a right of 
ownership.  Of course, it needs to be added that the Argentine authorities have pretty 
continuously disputed ownership over the period and critics of the doctrine have pointed out 
that it is little more than a legal cloak for the more basic doctrine, that might is right.  It is 
certainly the case that the reason why the situation did not change was because over this long 
period Argentina was not in a position to enforce, or have enforced, its claim.  On the other 
hand, if it is considered that possession (even disputed possession) over more than 150 years 
does not confer good title, then the potential for territorial dispute world-wide must be very 
large, perhaps undesirably so.  With whatever limitations, some version of the doctrine of 
prescription must be accepted if the long historical procession of war is ever to be ended. 
I conclude from this that Argentina has the basis of a claim in respect of the Falklands 
Islands but that it is not an overwhelming one.  It also must be added, that to say that there are 
grounds for such a claim (even without the qualification) is not to say that the Argentine 
authorities were morally justified in the violent repossession of the islands in 1982.  As 
indicated above, to justify the initiation of war it is also necessary to show that all alternatives 
have been exhausted, that war is, indeed, the last resort. 
In this connection, it might be observed on behalf of Argentina, that by 1982 there 
had already been one hundred and fifty years of argument and protest, and that the current 
phase of negotiations had been proceeding for fifteen years without satisfactory resolution.  If 
this does not amount to exhaustion of the non-violent possibilities (it might be asked), then 
what would do so, as far as the just war requirement is concerned?  On the other hand, it may 
seem that unless a state is actually subjected to attack, there is always something additional 
that might be done towards resolving the issue instead of using violence.  It is an important 
implication of this argument that the only just cause for war is prior aggression.  The 
argument does not, however, entail the conclusion that those subjected to aggression always 
have the right to fight back.  I shall return to the matter of aggression as a just cause a little 
later. 
The great uncertainty and the inevitable cost of war, also suggest a general duty to 
utilise non-violent options, whatever the wrong in question might be.  It seems clear that 
Argentina could have continued the negotiations that were proceeding, however fitfully, at 
the time of the onset of the war (by this time under United Nations auspices).  Despite British 
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foot-dragging, there was good reason to believe that the British Government would have been 
happy to be ultimately rid of the Falklands problem. 
There were, in fact, political reasons why Argentina did not continue the negotiations.  
The Argentine Government was desperately unpopular.  There was civil unrest.  It needed 
something to revive its political fortunes, and it was this that could not be delayed.  It was 
even suggested in the public press that the only thing that might meet this need would be a 
popular war. 
Similarly, there were political reasons why the British were dragging their feet over 
the negotiations.  There is also good reason to think that political considerations were 
significant in determining the British response once the invasion had taken place.  I shall 
return to this matter, in due course. 
I conclude, then, that despite the long period over which Argentina sought a 
satisfactory settlement of the dispute with Britain over the Falkland Islands, it cannot be 
claimed that all alternative avenues to war had been exhausted.  Thus, this factor does not 
strengthen the Argentine case. 
By contrast, the requirement that for a war to be just it must show a good prospect of 
success does seem to support the Argentine claim.  Indeed, in its initial phase the Argentine 
action was outstandingly successful.  All objectives were achieved and at a minimal cost in 
terms of human lives and general destruction.  There were, in fact, only a handful of soldiers 
killed or injured, almost all of them Argentine.  There seems to be no problem here, either in 
regard to proportion.  From an Argentine point of view, justice had been served at an absolute 
minimum cost.  It seemed that the prospect of Britain fighting to reclaim the islands, once 
they were occupied, was almost inconceivable. 
But for all that, we may ask whether it is really right to count ‘prospect of success’ as 
a positive value in a just war moral calculation.  Speaking more generally, it would seem 
strange to say that a powerful predatory state was more justified in attacking its neighbour in 
virtue of a high prospect of success.  It might be that this criterion only operates appropriately 
in a negative sense.  On this way of looking at things, prospect of success (where it is low) 
can only detract from a good just war case, already made on other grounds.  It cannot 
significantly enhance a poor one.  This argument may also be applied to a claim that the 
Argentine action generally was in proportion and that this adds to its justification.  Again, 
logic suggests that proportion, too, may only operate negatively.  An action that is prima-
facie justified on other ground may be called into question by an apparent lack of proportion.  
Actions are not morally proper merely because they seem to be in proportion to what is 
gained from them. 
 
Great Britain 
The basis of the just war claim as far as Britain is concerned is imply that it was a 
response to aggression.  Not only is this principle central to the just war tradition, it is also 
enshrined in international law.  Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, for example, 
provides for ‘the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence if armed attack 
occurs’.6  The 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Nuremberg Charter go further than this by 
stipulating that response to aggression is the only just cause.  The United Nations Charter to 
some degree equivocates on this point (in the context of anti-colonialism).  However, there is 
no doubt that de facto British territory was attacked on April 2, 1982, and, on that basis, there 
was a prima-facie right of violent response.  There are nonetheless a number of questions 
which might be raised, the effect of which might be held to significantly undermine the 
British just war claim. 
The first concerns the whole basis of the claim of self-defence.  The right of a state to 
defend itself against an act of aggression by another state is usually thought to be based on 
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the domestic analogy.  In this an individual subjected to attack that feels his life to be 
threatened by the assault and who has no other recourse (he cannot save himself by flight) is 
taken to be morally justified in using violence in his defence.  The weakness of the analogy as 
a support for state defence, is well shown-up in the Falklands case since here it may be 
plausibly argued that the lives and well-being of the islanders were not apparently at 
immediate threat from the presence of the occupying Argentine troops.  Gerard Fotion (Ethics 
for a Shrinking World) is one who argues this (although he does not explicitly link this 
conclusion go the domestic analogy).  The British attack was unjustified (he says) because 
the lives and personal security of the Falkland Islanders were not at peril.  Of course, the 
argument would be different if there were no citizens.  In this case we might agree with 
Fotion: 
 …. violent responses, even to acts of aggressive warfare, are 
unjustified if the aggression is not directed against human life but involves, 
say, slicing off an uninhabited piece of territory.7 
Although, even here, we might think there were general grounds for opposing 
aggression whenever it occurred.  I return to this topic later. 
But to say that the Falkland Islanders themselves were not endangered by the 
occupation is surely to over-simplify.  It is true that the civil population were by and large 
well treated by the occupation force but the fact remains that they were entirely at the whim 
of a notorious totalitarian regime which had an unenviable reputation for atrocity against its 
own people.  They would have had plenty of grounds to fear that once the new status quo had 
become accepted, any show of disagreement or dissent on their part could result in their 
joining the ranks of the ‘disappeared’. 
It may be that the right to national self-defence is less securely based on the domestic 
analogy in a case in which the attacking party merely intends to alter the political and 
administrative arrangements within the victim state but otherwise not detract from the 
personal security and autonomy of its citizens.  However, this must be a situation which has 
had few, if any, exemplifications.  It certainly cannot be said of the Falklands case.  Generally 
the personal security question cannot be separated from the broader issue protection of 
institutions.  A threat to the latter will almost always involved a threat to the former. 
Some formulations of the just war right to self-defence make reference to a response 
to ‘unprovoked aggression’.  In relation to the Falkland War it may be claimed that Britain 
was guilty of ‘a certain degree’ of provocation in its dealings with Argentina in the period 
leading up to the outbreak of war and that this factor detracts from its claim of just cause.  
Bluth is one who makes this specific point.  He says – 
…the Argentine Government correctly concluded that the British 
government was only interested in maintaining the pretence of achieving a 
peaceful and negotiated settlement with Argentina. (emphasis added)8 
However, this seems to me to be a misstatement of the situation.  It is certainly the 
case that the Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher was going slow on the 
negotiations in response to strong, populist, back-bench and opposition criticism (just as a 
Labour Government had experienced fifteen years before).  But the government was looking 
for a formula which would secure the support of Parliament and the Falkland Islanders 
because it did not wish to retain the territory any longer than it needed to.  There was no 
deception or pretence about what the ultimate aim of British policy was.  On the other hand, 
there are substantial grounds for ascribing contributory negligence to successive British 
administrations for allowing negotiations with Argentine authorities to drift over seventeen 
years, from 1977 to 1982.  More determined efforts could and should have been made to 
overcome the political difficulties standing in the way of a negotiated settlement.  This is 
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particularly so since the British authorities were made well aware several times over this 
period of the possibility that the Argentine government might take matters into its own hands. 
However, we also need to recognise here the political realities of life for a politician 
in a democratic state.  To take an unpopular stand of principle on a matter of apparently small 
relative importance (as the Falklands issue was seen to be by most British politicians) is to 
invite political destruction.  It may even show a lack of proportion.  With hindsight it is clear 
what should have been done and what significance political failure in this connection was to 
have but I do not think that it may be claimed that this was so obvious at the time.  It cannot, 
thus, be made the basis of heavy moral censure. 
There is another way of looking at this aspect of the matter and that is to say that the 
British Parliament was right to resist the handing over of the islands on any terms.  The 
Foreign Office, on the other hand, was doing neither one thing nor the other, being largely 
concerned to conceal its intentions from both the British Parliament and the Argentine 
government. 
Successive British governments failed in their duty …. (they were) 
indifferent to the wishes of the Falkland Islanders …. only Parliament saved 
the Falklands, prior to the Argentine invasion.9 
But even allowing that British policy formation in this area was indecisive and 
inconstant over a long period (perhaps, through genuine moral conflict) it is difficult to see 
this as amounting to a plausible cause for war.  This aspect of the run-up to hostilities, then, 
does not add to the Argentine justification for invasion.  It may, however, be taken to detract 
from the British just cause claim.  As indicated earlier, the right to self-defence is not an 
absolute one.  It is particularly problematical where the issue at stake (in this case sovereignty 
over the Falklands Islands) had not been strongly defended before hostilities began. 
At the same time there is an evident and significant difference between being willing 
(under certain conditions) to hand something over and having it snatched away.  In the latter 
case it is not simply a question of right of ownership or respect for the conditions of transfer 
but the general objectionability of ‘snatching’.  It is surely in the interest of the entire 
international community that disputes are resolved peacefully and that claimant groups do not 
have recourse to violence to satisfy their claims.  In the light of this it may be that in addition 
to a moral permission to resist aggression and defend interests there is also an obligation to 
do so.  Looked at in this way, it may be that an earlier failure to act appropriately only adds to 
the moral obligation to set things right. 
On the other hand, if it were thought that the situation had been deliberately contrived, 
then the moral claim of self-defence would simply collapse.  Dillon, who, like Bluth, is 
generally no supporter of British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, specifically rejects this 
possibility – 
The Prime Minister did not deliberately incite confrontation in order to 
revive her political fortunes ….there was no pre-set game plan for the military 
humiliation of Argentina.10 
Overall, it seems to me that neither the political ineptitude of the British government 
before the war, nor the positive political fall-out after its successful conclusion, detracts 
significantly from the just war case which it had to respond to Argentine aggression. 
The possibility that war might not have been the last resort seems a strange one to 
raise in the case of a party reacting to aggression.  However, this claim has been made11 in the 
case of the British response to the Argentine occupation of the Falkland Islands.  It arises 
because of the time taken for Britain to assemble and deploy forces during which (it is 
suggested) there were possibilities for a non-violent resolution of the conflict which would 
have met the minimum demands of either side.  In the initial phase, during which the British 
task force was approaching the Falkland Islands, negotiations between Britain and Argentina 
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were brokered by the United States Secretary of State, General Haig.  Despite some British 
concessions on what had been on offer before the war began, these negotiations failed.  It 
seems most likely that this was due to an Argentine belief that the British were bluffing12 and 
since Argentina was already in possession of the disputed territory, there was really no need 
for any concessions.  It might be added that for most of this time few members of the British 
cabinet believed that they would be going through with the operation on which they were 
ostensibly embarked. 
The crucial period was that of the first and second of May.  On 1 May British naval 
and air forces made a substantial attack on Argentine positions on the Falkland Islands.  This, 
it is suggested, convinced the Argentine leadership that Britain was serious and at this point 
the Argentineans would have been ready to settle on suitable terms.  Peru was at that moment 
in the process of putting together a peace plan along the lines of the previously rejected Haig 
proposal.  Bluth and others claim that significantly altered Argentine intentions are evidenced 
by an order to Argentine naval units to return to port.  They further claim that this possibility 
for peace was scuttled by the sinking on 2 May of the Argentine heavy cruiser General 
Belgrano – 
If the construction we have put on events is correct, then one could 
argue that the sinking of the Belgrano and subsequent military efforts violate 
the criterion of last resort.13 
However, there is substantial opinion that Bluth’s construction of events is seriously 
defective.  To begin with, it does not seem that the British authorities were aware of any 
Argentine change of heart or of the Peruvian peace proposals.  It is also likely that Bluth and 
his source (Gavshon and Rice) are mistaken about the intent of the naval messages sent to the 
Belgrano and other units of the Argentine navy.  This is Dillon’s account of the episode – 
….withdrawal signal was sent out which, according to Argentine 
sources, instructed the Northern Groups of Task Force 79 ‘to return to safer 
waters in order to wait for more suitable weather’.  It also directed the 
Belgrano group to return to the vicinity of Isla de los Estados, specifically to a 
position ‘in less deep water – no more than 120 metres – to avoid the presence 
of nuclear submarines’…. Gavshon and Rice seem to be alone in claiming that 
the instruction directed the Argentine ships ‘the Belgrano group included, 
“back to port” [emphasis added].  Neither of the most detailed Argentine 
accounts supports this point.  Both maintain instead that Argentina was 
effectively engaged in a tactical military withdrawal…14 
In the light of this it must be accepted that the prospects for a negotiated peace in the 
early days of May 1982, were not as bright as Bluth is claiming.  The other factors that must 
be recognised are that Argentina continued in possession of the Falkland Islands and would 
thus be favoured by every delay.  On the other hand, it is clear that British military assets, 
newly arrived and eight thousand miles from base, would waste rapidly in the hostile 
conditions of the South Atlantic in winter.  In these circumstances it is utterly unrealistic to 
have expected them to have waited in case peace proposals might have been forthcoming.  
The spirit of the just war tradition cannot require a party attacked to so prejudice its interests.  
I conclude that at this point there was no alternative to a violent response. 
Despite this conclusion the submarine attack on the General Belgrano has seemed to 
many to have been gratuitous and disproportionate.  More than one third of the entire 
fatalities of the war were accounted for by this action (368 out of 907 on both sides).  The 
ship may not have been returning to port but it was apparently well away from the action at 
the time and did not appear to constitute an immediate threat to British forces.  Certainly, it 
was beyond the ‘Total Exclusion Zone’ around the Falkland Islands that been proclaimed as 
British forces reached the vicinity themselves.  On the other hand, British authorities had 
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issued (on 23 April)” ….a public warning that the carrier battle group would attack any 
Argentine forces seeking to interfere with its ‘mission’…” (Such a declaration was required 
under United Nations Charter Article 51, which authorised response to aggression.)15  
Moreover, it does seem strange, in the context of an on-going war, to suggest that only units 
in contact with the other side, or moving close to it, are legitimate targets.  By May 2, it was 
clear that general conflict had begun.  In such a situation all forces, including those held in 
reserve, must be equally vulnerable.  This construction of event sis supported by the 
Argentine commander of the naval task force that included the General Belgrano (Admiral 
Allara).  He is reported as saying that he could not criticise the action – 
She (the Belgrano) was a ship carrying out a war mission and military 
mission connected with the conflict.16 
The Belgrano and its attendant exocet-armed frigates had the potential to add 
significantly to the task force’s problems, especially when the landing phase of the operation 
began.  (They were also so placed as to intercept possible British supply from the Pacific.)  
Indeed, the rationale behind the Argentine order referred to above seems to have been that the 
British attack of 1 May was not judged to be associated with an attempted landing, so that 
Argentine naval units were to be withdrawn to beyond British carrier-born aircraft range 
(and, hopefully, submarine range) until that event occurred. 
Overall, it does not seem to me that the sinking of the General Belgrano presents any 
special problem as far as the just war is concerned.  It was the warship of a belligerent party 
in a war zone in a time of war.  As far as proportion is concerned, it may be significant that 
after May 2 Argentine naval forces (which included an aircraft carrier) played no further part 
in the conflict.  In view of the narrow margin for success of the British operation (which I 
shall discuss in greater detail below), this may have been of the utmost significance.  Finally, 
as argued above, it is clear that the sinking of the Belgrano had no substantial influence on 
the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the Falklands conflict.  As indicated earlier, by May 
2 these were minimal in any event. 
This conclusion is further supported by testimony from key persons in the United 
States State Department (especially General Vernon Walters, who was Secretary of State 
Haig’s deputy).  In the American view, the Peruvian proposal was less acceptable to 
Argentina than the earlier (US) peace formula.  The Americans could not understand why this 
had not been accepted – 
The final proposal …. I really cannot believe that the British agreed to 
it but they did…. was the fleet would stop, the Argentines would evacuated 
the Island in accord with the UN resolution, a tripartite administration would 
be set up in the Falklands.17 
The problem was simply that the Argentine government saw no reason to make any 
concession whatsoever because they did not believe that the British would really fight.  
General Walters, who was a Spanish speaker, tried to convince them otherwise but failed.  He 
reports that Argentine leader, General Galtieri, as saying ‘that woman (Margaret Thatcher) 
wouldn’t dare!’ 
In the opinion of many commentators, the prospects of success for the British task 
force were really quite modest.  This judgement was based on the long distance of the 
operation from home base, the minimal potential for air cover (effectively the carrier-based 
harrier aircraft), the lack of effective early-warning radar cover and the strength and 
sophistication of enemy formations.  In the light of this it may be reasonably asked whether 
the British government was morally justified in undertaking the reclamation of the Falkland 
Islands, at all.  As has already been observed, the just war requires a good prospect of 
success.  In this case it would appear that this would not have been present. 
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But, again, we must ask, how should this prospect of success requirement be applied?  
At first sight it would seem to imply that a small state that was attacked by a much larger 
neighbour (a 'Belgium’, for instance) would have no right to fight in its defence.  Such a 
conclusion appears counter-intuitive.  Surely (we might think) the victim nation has the right 
to defend itself, however limited its prospects might appear.  Such action would at least 
extract a price from the aggressor and it might be a price he was unprepared to pay.  Certainly 
we could argue, from a rule-utilitarian standpoint, that it is generally desirable that aggressors 
be resisted.  Not to do so, would be to encourage international lawlessness, rather than inhibit 
it.  We may allow that a diminished prospect of success ought to detract from the moral case 
for initiating  violent action, in whatever good cause.  It is less clear that it should do so in the 
case of response to aggression. 
I conclude that insofar as it is the case that military prospects in the matter of retaking 
the Falkland Islands were as limited as has been claimed, this did not significantly detract 
from the claim to be acting justly in attempting to do so.  As I shall argue below, there are 
occasions when what has to be done, simply has to be done. 
The matter of proportionality may be raised both in relation to individual actions in a 
war and in relation to the war as a whole.  On the face of it, the cost of the Falkland War in 
both financial and human terms was out of all proportion to the value of the territory or to the 
political freedoms defended.  Hastings and Jenkins are very clear on this point.  It was (they 
say) – 
….patently disproportionate to send 1,000 men to their deaths simply 
to enable 1800 British citizens (and half citizens) to keep the government of 
their choice.18 
On the other hand they do think that it was politically desirable to set an example 
against aggression and that the British response to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland 
Islands was necessary to avoid ‘a severe blow to British self-respect and confidence’. 
However, it does not appear to me that the matter is as clear as this.  It seems 
reasonable to ask just what level  of ‘expenditure’ would have been proportionate in this 
case?  And, how, anyway, are such calculations to be performed?  And, again, if the moral 
justification in this kind of case is also to be seen in terms of a general obligation to oppose 
aggression (as Hastings and Jenkins seem to accept), how is that to be valued? 
As indicated above, it may be appropriate simply to say that there are some things that 
just have to be done.  It is a bit like search and rescue.  Here the rule of thumb seems to be, 
that we do what is necessary (and incur the cost, hereof) all the while there is a prospect of 
success.  What we do not have is a per capita ‘rate for the job’.  Although we do have a sense 
that there are occasions when we may reluctantly judge that further effort is not justified (i.e. 
it would be out of proportion).  If the same principle is applied to a war in response to 
aggression, it would suggest that we are morally justified in doing whatever we have to do, 
within a wide cost margin, as long as we have a reasonable prospect of success.  In a case 
such as the Falklands, then, it is not simply a question of the value of the real estate or the 
importance we accord to the interests of those affected, but equally it is a matter of our 
obligation to stand by principle.  The extent of obligation, especially in the latter context, is 
inherently difficult to quantify but it may not necessarily be determined by a narrow cost-
benefit analysis.  Certainly, it cannot be imagined that a party that still had a demonstrable 
prospect of success would break off action and give up all because it now judged that the 




There are strong utilitarian grounds for supporting a general rule that the only just 
cause for war is prior aggression.  My position here is substantially that taken at Nuremberg.  
That is – 
….that no grievances or policies will justify resort to aggressive war 
…. whatever grievances a nation may have, however objectionable it finds the 
status-quo, aggressive warfare is an illegal means for settling those grievances 
or for altering those conditions.19 
Argentina, then, had a just cause in virtue of its long-standing territorial claim over 
the Falklands Islands but it did not have a just cause for war.  In the light of this, questions 
such as those of proportionality and prospect of success become irrelevant. 
Britain had a just cause for war (response to aggression) but its moral position was 
compromised by the extent to which it unwittingly drew Argentina towards the initiation of 
conflict and the inevitable disproportion between the value of the interests being defended 
and the cost of that defence.20  This factor, however, does not extinguish the British claim to 
be acting justly in a matter of self-defence. 
The Falklands War was a war that should not have occurred.  Unlike many disputes, 
world wide, there was (as Dillon observes21) no lack of suitable peace formulas, 
notwithstanding the apparent objections of the islanders themselves to a transfer of 
sovereignty.  The wishes of the local inhabitants is not to be taken as an overriding 
consideration any more than it has been in the case of Hong Kong.  It is hard to believe that a 
determined effort to bring local opinion around could not have been successful, particularly if 
it had been backed up by the application of only a fraction of the financial resources which 
were subsequently used in the military defence of the islands. 
The blame for the failure to find a peaceful solution to the dispute may equally be laid 
at the door of the Argentine Government.  They should have been aware that a satisfactory 
resolution was only a matter of time, and not all that long a time, either.  But it was the 
Argentine Government that abandoned persuasion and diplomacy and took to coercion and 
violence.  It is thus they who must bear the bulk of the responsibility for the war and, 
incidentally, for the fact the Falklands dispute is now that much harder to resolve. 
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